








While it can be shown that Spohn’s principle doesn’t hold in the case of strategic thinking, one could also question whether it holds in the case of non-sequential decision making. For Spohn’s reason for adopting his principle in the first place can be criticized.

1. Introduction
	Spohn (1977, 1978) claims that his causal decision theory - an advancement of Fishburn's theory (1964) - is valuable for making explicit a principle which is used by Savage (1954/1972) and Fishburn (1964). The principle is the following: "Any adequate quantitative decision model must not explicitly or implicitly contain any subjective probabilities for acts."​[2]​ (Spohn 1977, p. 114) This principle, which I henceforth call Spohn's principle, isn't used in the rational decision theories of Jeffrey (1965) and of Luce and Krantz (1971), so Spohn (1978). According to Spohn (1977) his principle is important, because it has implications for the concept of action, Newcomb's problem (Nozick 1969), the theory of causality, and freedom of will.​[3]​ In a recent paper Spohn (1999, pp. 44-45) modifies his principle. For he postulates that in the case of strategic thinking, that is in the case of sequential decision making, the decision maker can ascribe subjective probabilities to his future, but not to his present actions without giving a justification for his claim.​[4]​
	Because Spohn's principle has so many implications, Spohn (1977, 1978) makes his principle more precise, suggests arguments for it (e. g. point (4)), and points out immediate consequences of it (e. g. point (5)): 
(1) Spohn's principle refers to future actions of the decision maker. 
(2) Credences for actions don't manifest themselves in the willingness to bet on these actions. 
(3) Spohn's principle requires that actions are things which are under the decision maker's full control relatively to the decision model describing him.
(4) A theoretical reason for Spohn's principle is that credences for actions cannot manifest themselves in these actions.
(5) An immediate consequence of Spohn's principle is that unconditional credences for events which probabilistically depend on actions are forbidden.
In the following I will explain and criticize each of these five points in detail.

2. Spohn's Principle Refers to Future Actions of the Decision Maker
	Spohn's principle doesn't refer to past actions and actions of other persons, but only to actions which are open to the decision maker in his decision model, that is to future actions of the decision maker. Yet future actions is ambiguous. It can either refer to actions that are performable now and extend into the future or it can refer to actions that are not performable now, but will be in the future. As I understand Spohn, his principle refers to actions that are performable now and extend into the future. For Spohn (1977, p. 115) concedes that decision makers frequently have and utter beliefs about their future actions like the following:
(1) "I believe it is improbable that I will wear shorts during the next winter."
Moreover, Spohn (1977, p. 116) points out that "As soon as I have to make up my mind whether to wear my shorts outdoors or not, my utterance is out of place.". Thus decision makers shouldn't assign subjective probabilities to actions that are performable now, but extend into the future.
Yet Spohn (1977, p. 115) wants this utterance to be understood in such a way that it doesn't express a credence for an action, but a credence for a decision situation: 
(2) "I believe it is improbable that I will get into a decision situation during the next winter in which it would be best to wear shorts."
Thus Spohn assumes that the embedded sentences "I will wear shorts during the next winter" and "I will get into a decision situation during the next winter in which it would be best to wear shorts" are logically equivalent, which is not true. For while it might be the case that I will not wear shorts during the next winter, it might happen that I get into a decision situation during the next winter in which it would be best to wear shorts.
If we, however, despite the logical inequivalence, concede this opinion to Spohn for a while, we can observe that something else goes wrong. According to Spohn the following utterance
(3) "I believe it is improbable that I will run 100 meters in 9 seconds during the next year."
should be reformulated, since (3) doesn't express a genuine probability for an action: 
(4) "I believe it is improbable that I will get into a decision situation during the next year in which it would be best to run 100 meters in 9 seconds." 
Yet while (3) might be true, (4) might be false. With regard to (3) I know because of my bodily constitution it wouldn't matter how much I tried, I never would be able to run 100 meters in 9 seconds, so indeed I believe it is improbable that I will run 100 meters in 9 seconds during the next year. At the same time with regard to (4) it could happen that the Olympic Games were to take place next year and luckily I qualified for the Olympic team of my country, so that I were in a decision situation in which it would be best for me to run 100 meters in 9 seconds. Thus my belief that it is improbable that I will get into a decision situation during the next year in which it would be best for me to run 100 meters in 9 seconds would be false. Hence there might be a belief context in which (3) is true, but (4) is false.
	What is the relevance of these insights? Because Spohn's principle only refers to actions that are performable now and extend into the future, his reformulation of actions that are not performable now, but will be performable in the future, is of no relevance for Spohn's principle. One can deny that (1) and (2) respectively (3) and (4) are synonyms and still accept Spohn's principle. Furthermore, one can even ask why it is so important for Spohn to find alternative interpretations of (1) and (3)? By putting forth alternative interpretations Spohn seems to defend the view that even in the case of actions that are not performable now, but will be performable in the future the decision maker shouldn't assign any subjective probabilities to his actions. But we have just seen that this is not so, that is Spohn allows the decision maker to assign subjective probabilities to his actions that are performable in the future. Yet strictly put in Spohn’s view even utterances like (1) don't express a genuine probability for an action, but only a probability for a decision situation. Thus Levi's (1997, p. 80) suggestion that these interpretations are meant to express that the decision maker isn't even able to predict his actions that are not performable now, but will be in the future turns out to be right.​[5]​
	There is another way to support Spohn's principle. Spohn could argue that his principle is satisfied, if the decision maker puts the probabilities in the states of the world and not in the actions. To see how this works, let's consider the case in which the decision maker's action is to walk across the room: This action is often easy to accomplish, but there may be circumstances, that is states of the world, which may prevent the decision maker from accomplishing it. In such a case one replaces the decision maker's action "I walk across the room." by "I try to walk across the room." and partitions the states of the world in the following way: s1 & I will walk across the room, if I try. vs. s1 & I will not walk across the room, if I try. Furthermore, this procedure can be generalized, so that it doesn't only apply to acts, but also to probabilistic acts​[6]​. For in Jeffrey's (1983, p. 178) "trying to hit the bullseye" the same procedure is possible: The decision maker's action "I hit the bullseye." is replaced by "I try to hit the bullseye.", and the states of the world are partitioned in the following way: s1 & I will hit the bullseye, if I try. vs. s1 & I will not hit the bullseye, if I try.​[7]​ Therefore Spohn could argue that his principle cannot only be applied to acts, but can also be extended to probabilistic acts. 
	Up to now Spohn has never considered this whole procedure, so that it is possible that he is against it. In case of the latter he could argue that his principle demands that any adequate quantitative decision model must not even implicitly contain any probabilities for acts. By shifting the probabilities from the actions to the states of the world Spohn could claim that the decision model implicitly contains probabilities for acts. Unfortunately Spohn doesn't tell us what implicit containment with respect to Spohn's principle means. Furthermore, Spohn could argue that in an adequate quantitative decision model one cannot shift probabilities from actions to states of the world. But Spohn doesn't specify what an adequate quantitative decision model is. 
I think shifting the probabilities from the actions to the states of the world is a rather arbitrary procedure. One could equally ask why don't you shift the probabilities from the states of the world to the actions. I mean shouldn't one have an independent reason for adopting this procedure than just its compliance with Spohn's principle? Moreover, one could also argue that an adequate quantitative decision model must be able to deal with sequential decision problems. Furthermore, in these decision problems the choice of an action may change its status over time from outcome to action to state of the world (cf. Skyrms 1990), so that if you assign a probability to an outcome and it changes its status to an action, why should it lose the already assigned probability? It should only be appropriately updated. With this we have also provided a justification for Spohn’s modification of his principle in the case of strategic thinking.
3. Credences for Actions Don't Manifest Themselves in the Willingness to Bet on these Actions
	According to Spohn (1978) it is commonly accepted that credences for particular events manifest themselves in the willingness to bet on these events with appropriate betting odds and that this doesn't apply to credences for actions.​[8]​ For the willingness of the agent to bet on his own action just depends on his gain, that is on the stake of his betting partner, so that his own stake is quite irrelevant. He will accept the bet only if his gain is so high that his action together with his gain is to be preferred to all alternatives. Spohn (1978, p. 73) illustrates this by the following example:
"If someone ... offered me DM 30 to watch a particular movie, I would presumably accept, while I wouldn't accept it, if someone offered me only DM 5 - both being independent of what the other person would get from me, if I didn't watch the movie."​[9]​ 
	Considering Spohn's example I would like to ask whether it is a bet at all; Spohn (1978, p. 73, footnote 22) concedes that it is only a bet-like agreement. If we suppose that it is a bet, one has to ask whether it is really the case that I would join a bet at DM 30 and wouldn't join a bet at DM 5 if my own stake was > DM 30,  DM 5 and  DM 30, or < DM 5. Let's consider the case that my stake is DM 10,000 (negative change from reference point​[10]​). If money were important to me, and if I owned just a little bit more than DM 10,000 (reference point), then I would neither at DM 30 nor at DM 5 agree (positive change from reference point), for there could always happen something, which could hinder me from watching the movie, and the risk to lose DM 10,000 would be too high for me even if I were highly risk prone​[11]​. By considering this case we see that the willingness of the agent to bet on his own action doesn't depend solely on the stake of his betting partner, but also on his own stake. Furthermore, such factors as risk aversion, reference point, and the amount of change from the reference point seem to influence the willingness of the agent to bet.
	In my opinion the willingness of the agent to bet on his own action given a real bet depends in the following way on his own stake and on the stake of his betting partner: Suppose that I bet with Y that I will run 100 meters in 9 seconds during the next year. If the stake of Y were DM 1,000, we would nevertheless argue without considering the reference point and the amount of change from the reference point that my stake given a moderate risk aversion would depend in the following way on my credence for reaching the goal: The first maxim is to keep my own stake as low as possible, for I want to keep my own possible loss as low as possible. But the more improbable I think it is that I will reach my goal, the lesser my stake should be in comparison to your stake; and the more probable it is that I will reach my goal, the higher my stake could be in comparison to your stake; if, however, the credence that I will reach my goal is c = 0.5, my stake could equal the stake of my betting partner.
	There is one way to rescue Spohn's claim. For one could argue that the following justification of his claim is more plausible: Credences for actions don't manifest themselves in the willingness to bet on these actions, because the decision maker has to factor in the pleasure or displeasure associated with doing ai in the willingness to bet on ai. Thus the more the decision maker likes to do ai, the more the decision maker is willing to bet on his doing ai; and the less the decision maker likes to do ai, the less the decision maker is willing to bet on his doing ai. Therefore the decision maker's willingness to bet on his actions isn't only influenced by his credences for his actions, but also by the decision maker's degree of pleasure associated with doing his actions. Nevertheless this proposal leaves the possibility open that the decision maker's willingness to bet on his actions is influenced by his credences for his actions which Spohn wants to avoid. Thus Spohn cannot adopt this proposal.

4. Spohn's Principle Requires that Actions Are under the Decision Maker's Full Control
	According to Spohn (1977) his principle requires that actions are things which are under the decision maker's full control not in an absolute sense, but relatively to the decision model describing him. Spohn (1977, p. 114) illustrates this by the following example: When the decision maker wants to go from here to there, this action isn't under his full control in an absolute sense, because there could be obstacles. But for reasons of simplicity a decision model can assume that actions are under the decision maker's full control. Thus Spohn (1977) ideally assumes that actions are under the decision maker's full control.
	On first sight the requirement of full control over actions seems to have some problematic consequences. For if the decision maker's actions are under the decision maker's full control relatively to the decision model describing him, this includes that the decision maker must be willing to bet his life on these actions and that the decision maker must assign a credence of one to these actions.​[12]​ Yet on second sight the requirement of full control over actions does not imply that the decision maker assigns a credence of one to his actions. It implies instead that he believes with certainty that for each action, if he were to decide for a particular action, he would perform that particular action. Thus the decision maker believes with a subjective probability of one that his actions are efficacious. Nevertheless if the decision maker believes something with certainty he should be willing to bet his life on that, which is an absurd consequence in my opinion. 
Moreover, if Spohn says that for reasons of simplicity a decision model can assume that actions are under the decision maker’s full control, one could object that for reasons of simplicity a decision model can assume almost anything. That is for reasons of simplicity a decision model can also assume that the states of the world are under the decision maker’s full control, which seems unreasonable from my point of view. Thus Spohn has to provide us with a better justification for this move.

5. Credences for Actions Cannot Manifest Themselves in these
	Spohn (1978) mentions a theoretical reason for Spohn's principle, namely that credences for actions cannot manifest themselves in these actions. Spohn (1977) gives the following argument to support his claim: Credences for actions play no part in rational decision making. For in rational decision making it is only important how much the decision maker likes his actions, what he believes to result from his actions, and how much he likes his outcomes. In the end the decision maker decides for the action which he likes most regardless of its credence. According to Spohn (1977) decision models should only capture the decision maker's cognitive and motivational dispositions which manifest themselves in his decisions and preferences. Credences for actions are not of this sort. For one could tell neither from the decision maker's decisions nor from his preferences what his credences are. Therefore credences for actions shouldn't be contained in decision models, so Spohn. 
But can one tell from the decision maker's decisions or from his preferences what his utilities for his outcomes are? I don't see how this can be done. Thus utilities for outcomes shouldn't be contained in decision models either, if one follows Spohn's argumentation through. Yet this is an absurd consequence in my opinion. Moreover, even if one cannot tell from the decision maker's decisions or preferences what the decision maker's credences are, one could always ask the decision maker what his credences are.
6. Unconditional Credences for Events which Probabilistically Depend on Actions Are Forbidden​[13]​
	Spohn (1977) claims that if Spohn's principle holds, unconditional credences for events which are probabilistically dependent on actions are forbidden. For, so Spohn (1977), if a particular event E is probabilistically dependent on an action, that is c(Ea1)  c(Ea1) for some action a1 and its complement a1, then c(a1) can be inferred from c(E) by means of c(a1) = [c(E)-c(Ea1)]/[c(Ea1)-c(Ea1)]. Therefore if a decision maker attributes an unconditional credence to an event, he must assume that this event is probabilistically independent of his actions.

7. Conclusion
(1)	I have clarified that Spohn’s principle which is a rationality constraint on the decision maker’s deliberation refers to actions that are performable now and extend into the future. Moreover, defending Spohn’s principle by shifting the probabilities from the actions to the states of the world is a rather arbitrary procedure. In sequential decision problems, though, the choice of an action may change its status over time, so that probabilities may get updated, too.
(2)	The willingness of the agent to bet on his own action doesn’t depend solely on the stake of the betting partner, but also on his own stake, and on such factors as risk aversion, reference point, and change from reference point.
(3)	The assumption that actions are under the decision maker’s full control has problematic consequences and therefore should be abandoned.
(4)	Spohn’s justification for his principle can be criticized, so that he has to provide us with a better one.
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^1	 I want to thank Andreas Blank, Phil Dowe, James Joyce, Wolfgang Spohn, Howard Sobel, and especially an anonymous referee from the BJPS for very helpful comments.
^2	 Trivial conditional subjective probabilities, like P(a1SYMBOL 124 \f "Symbol" \s 10a1) = 1 for an action a1 or P(a2SYMBOL 124 \f "Symbol" \s 10a1) = 0 for two disjunctive actions a1 and a2, are not considered.
^3	 Spohn’s principle might also have some consequences for making up dutch books (cf. Levi 1987).
^4	 Spohn is not the only one to defend his principle. For the weaker thesis that the decision maker shouldn't ascribe subjective probabilities of one or zero to his actions is widely accepted (cf. Ginet 1962; Goldman 1970; Jeffrey 1977, 1983; Levi 1986; Schick 1979, 1999; Shackle 1967). Even the stronger thesis that the decision maker shouldn't ascribe any subjective probabilities to his actions is defended (cf. Levi 1989, 1997).
^5	 With this we have discovered a further implication of Spohn's principle, namely that if Spohn's principle holds, the decision maker isn't able to predict his own actions that are performable now and extend into the future. Yet that deliberation crowds out prediction has already been widely discussed in the literature (cf. Shackle 1967; Ginet 1962; Goldman 1970, chapter 6; Pears 1968; Jeffrey 1965, 1977, 1983; Schick 1979, 1999; Levi 1986, section 4.3, 1989, 1997).
^6	 Jeffrey (1983, p. 177) postulates probabilistic acts, which are actions with probabilistic outcomes, in analogy to probabilistic observations. Jeffrey (1965, chapter 5.8, 1968, 1983, chapter 5.8) believes that all actions - acts and probabilistic acts - are probabilistic. Acts are only probably successful, because as Jeffrey (1983, p. 83) states: "... one can always take a strict point of view from which the agent can only try to perform the act indicated ... ."
^7	 This whole procedure, namely putting the probabilities in the states of the world and not in the actions, can also be applied to Jeffrey's (1983) ratificationism and Jeffrey's (1988) probabilism. For in Jeffrey's (1983) ratificationism the decision maker conditions by the final decision to perform the actions, and in Jeffrey's (1988) probabilism the decision maker conditions by the performance of the actions like in Jeffrey's (1965) logic of decision.
^8	 Levi (1997, p. 32) takes a similar stance.
^9	 The translation is mine.
^10	 Kahneman and Tversky (1988) say that you should consider value as a function with two arguments: The asset position that serves as reference point and the magnitude of the change (positive or negative) from that reference point.
^11	 Arrow (1971) and Pratt (1964) have done pioneer work on the topic of risk aversion.
^12	 One can object that this inclusion doesn't follow, if one understands c = 1 as an idealisation for reasons of simplicity. Yet it seems to me that decision theorists actually make this inclusion. For when I asked Howard Sobel in personal communication of the 28th of July, 1998: "If you say that options are things of which the decision maker is certain that they are completely under his control, so that the decision maker would assign a subjective probability of one to that option, would you also say that the decision maker would be willing to bet his life on that option?", he answered on the 21st of August, 1998: "Yes! The theory is for a simple case of an idealised decision maker who is always sure what he can do. Perhaps you and I are never sure of anything."
^13	 Further important consequences of Spohn’s principle are: (1) In opposition to causal decision theories (for example, Gibbard and Harper 1978; Skyrms 1980, 1982, 1984; Sobel 1986; Lewis 1981; Spohn 1978) and Kyburg's (1980) proposal to maximize properly epistemic utility evidential decision theories, like Jeffrey's (1965, 1988, 1996) and Eells' (1981, 1982, 1985), violate Spohn's principle, because the decision maker conditions his credences by his actions in calculating the utility of an action. Jeffrey's (1983) ratificationism shows a similar feature. For the decision maker conditions his credences by his final decisions to perform his actions. Nozick's (1993) proposal of combining various decision principles disagrees with Spohn's principle by using evidential decision principles. Meek and Glymour (1994) claim that if the decision maker views his actions as non-interventions in the system, he conditions his credences by his actions, so that Spohn's principle is violated, too. (2) By means of Spohn's principle the decision maker cannot take his actions as evidence of the states of the world. For the decision maker's credence function cannot be modified by the evidence of the actions, if Spohn's principle demands that the decision maker shouldn't assign any credences to his actions. Thus Jeffrey's (1965) logic of decision, which takes actions as evidence of states of the world, cannot be right, if Spohn's principle is valid. Other rational decision theories also contain that the decision maker cannot take his actions as evidence of the states of the world. For in Jeffrey's ratificationism (1983) the decision maker takes his decisions, but not his actions as evidence of the states of the world, in Eells' (1981, 1982, 1985) proposal of the common cause the decision maker's beliefs and wants and not his actions are evidence of the states of the world, and in Kyburg's (1980, 1988) proposal of maximising properly epistemic utility the decision maker doesn't take his free actions as evidence of the states of the world. (3) Another consequence of Spohn's principle is to favor Savage's (1954/1972) trinitarianism, distinguishing between acts, states, and consequences, over Jeffrey’s (1965) monotheism, where acts, states, and consequences are all events or propositions, and therefore should be treated all alike.
